

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 NSC-05 PM-03 USIE-00 NSCE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

EUR-12 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: OPTION III: UK, FRG CONCERNs OVER COMMON
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CEILING

REFS: A. NATO 3867 B. NATO 3868 C. NATO 3856
D. MBFR VIENNA 385

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT PURPOSE OF CONSULTATIONS IS BEST SERVED IF SPC CONCENTRATES ON TWO PRINCIPAL DRAFTS BEFORE IT; I.E., DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AHG AND SUPPLEMENTARY UNDERSTANDINGS, INSTEAD OF DISCUSSING SEPARATE ALLIED PAPERS. WE WERE GRATIFIED BRITISH ACCEPTED THIS APPROACH AND AGREED TO TABLE PAPER ON CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT EXPECTING THAT SPC WOULD WORK OR AGREE ON IT (PARA 14, REFTEL C). WE WOULD PREFER THAT FRG FOLLOW SAME COURSE, PRESENTING ITS IDEAS AS PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO PARA 3 OF US SUPPLEMENTARY UNDERSTANDINGS PAPER, AS FRG REP INDICATED IN JULY 18 TRILATERAL (PARA 4, REFTEL C).

2. WE APPRECIATE THAT FRG PAPER WAS PROPOSED AS AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE US AND UK VIEWS ON PARA 3 OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY

UNDERSTANDING. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH BOTH OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IT PRESENTS, AND BELIEVE NEITHER APPROACH WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE REMAIN FIRM ON THE US PROPOSED LANGUAGE.

3. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT REQUIRING THE EAST TO AGREE IN PHASE I TO A SPECIFIC LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING IS AN UNDESIRABLE APPROACH FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE. IT WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF RAISING OUR DEMANDS ON THE EAST AND WOULD THUS WEAKEN THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF AN OPTION III OFFER. MOREOVER, IT WOULD FORCE THE ALLIES TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A SPECIFIC LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING. WHOLLY APART FROM DEFINITIONAL ISSUES, ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC LEVEL FOR THE COMMON CEILING REDUCES ALLIANCE FLEXIBILITY IN SETTING THE EXACT SIZE AND NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF NATO PHASE II REDUCTIONS. IN OUR VIEW, A
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DECISION OF THE PRECISE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON THE APPORTIONMENT OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. FINALLY, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT LEAD TO ADDITIONAL EASTERN PRESSURE FOR NATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN PHASE I RELATING TO PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DOUBT THAT THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, THAT OF REQUIRING EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON THE SIZE OF MANPOWER DISPARITIES (BASED ON EITHER PRE- OR POST- PHASE I LEVELS), WOULD BE EASIER TACTICALLY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON OVERALL MANPOWER DATA IN PHASE I, IN ADVANCE OF THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS FOR WHICH THE DATA WOULD BE NEEDED. THIS, AGAIN WOULD WEAKEN THE IMPACT OF THE OPTION III OFFER AND MIGHT LEAD TO

ADDITIONAL EASTERN PRESSURE FOR MORE DETAILED NATO
COMMITMENTS ABOUT THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF PHASE II
REDUCTIONS.

5. ONE UNDESIRABLE FEATURE OF FRG PAPER, WHICH YOU
MAY MENTION AT YOUR DISCRETION TO FRGREPS, IS REFERENCE
TO POSSIBILITY (PARA 5) OF STRETCHING IMPLEMENTATION OF
OPTION III OUT TILL THE END OF PHASE II. THIS APPROACH
RISKS SOVIET RETALIATION CONCERNING THE STRETCHED-OUT
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TANK ARMY AND THUS REDUCES SIGNIFICANTLY
THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAINTAINING THESEPARABILITY OF THE
TWO PHASES.

6. REGARDING THE UK CEILINGS PAPER (REFTEL B) YOU MAY DRAW,
AS APPROPRIATE, UPON STATE 152142 IN COMMENTING ON IT. YOU
MAY ALSO NOTE PRIVATELY TO THE UK DELOFFS THAT THE US
APPROACH PROPOSES PUTTING LIMITATIONS ON SSM LAUNCHERS,

NOT ON THE MISSILES THEMSELVES; THE LANGUAGE OF PARA 7
OF THE UK PAPER IS AMBIGUOUS ON THIS POINT. KISSINGER

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